A properly demanded jury trial on the issue of just compensation "is a matter of right,"

Identify agencies that should serve: Instituting structural, procedural, and role changes aimed at the EPA moving sailing away.

Historic progress: "I will leave the EPA confident the ship is sailing in the right direction."
Please Provide a comprehensive review of all facets of undertaking this federal enforcement case.

Alternatives For Managing The Nation’s Complex

	Date	Reason For Modification
--	5/10/18	Other Administrative Action
ARCHITECT-ENGINEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IRON MOUNTAIN MINE LONG TERM RESPONSE ACTION OVERSIGHT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MOD IS TO EXTEND THE POP END DATE TO 3/23/2019.
--	11/30/17	Other Administrative Action
ARCHITECT-ENGINEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IRON MOUNTAIN MINE LONG TERM RESPONSE ACTION OVERSIGHT
$19.2k	2/10/17	Other Administrative Action
ARCHITECT-ENGINEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IRON MOUNTAIN MINE LONG TERM RESPONSE ACTION OVERSIGHT
--	9/1/16	Other Administrative Action
ARCHITECT-ENGINEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IRON MOUNTAIN MINE LONG TERM RESPONSE ACTION OVERSIGHT
$51.8k	5/18/16	Other Administrative Action
ARCHITECT-ENGINEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IRON MOUNTAIN MINE LONG TERM RESPONSE ACTION OVERSIGHT
--	3/21/16	Other Administrative Action
ARCHITECT-ENGINEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IRON MOUNTAIN MINE LONG TERM RESPONSE ACTION OVERSIGHT
$20.5k	1/15/16	Other Administrative Action
A&E ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IMM
--	8/4/15	Other Administrative Action
A&E ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IMM
$32.5k	5/18/15	Other Administrative Action
A&E ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IMM
--	4/29/15	Other Administrative Action
A&E ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, IMM

When a law is decided through a system of "individualized assessments," strict scrutiny applies. Id. at 884. Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove its law rests on a "compelling interest" and is narrowly tailored. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).

Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain:
Exploring the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions

Scientists are increasingly finding evidence that everyday chemicals, pharmaceuticals and human hormones pass right through the treatment plants and into waterways across the country.

Fixing a problem that’s a century in the making

How did we get here?

No good deed goes unpunished: the CERCLA BFPP defense in the wake of Ashley II

In 2002 the U.S. Congress enacted the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (the 2002 Brownfields Amendments), offering property owners the specter of relief from the joint, strict and several liability scheme of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). It did so by adding certain Landowner Liability Protections (LLPs) under the Act: the bona fide prospective purchaser (BFPP) defense (42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40) and 9607(r)) and the contiguous property owner (CPO) defense (42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)), and a modified “innocent landowner” defense (42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(i)(II)). The BFPP defense is particularly noteworthy because it explicitly allows a purchaser to buy land with knowledge that it is contaminated, yet have a potential defense to federal Superfund liability.1

In the intervening eight years, neither EPA nor the courts have done much to clarify the scope of the LLPs or to provide a roadmap regarding how to maximize the likelihood of qualifying for any of these protections. Now, at least one trial court has offered some guidance on the BFPP defense and, in the process, probably made these protections even more ephemeral than ever.2 In fact, the most likely outcome is more litigation between the parties as they have even more issues about which to argue.

Background of the Case

Ashley II of Charleston, LLC vs. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. et al., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104772 (Civ. Action No. 2:05-cv-2782-MBS) (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2010), decided by the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina on October 13, 2010, involved a number of cost recovery and contribution actions by current and former owners and operators of 43 acres of industrial land in Charleston, South Carolina. Phosphate fertilizer plants had operated on and near the site since the late 1880s and had caused extensive contamination, including lead, arsenic, polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and acidic (low pH) conditions. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that the site met the requirements for initiating a Non-Time-Critical Removal Action under the National Contingency Plan (NCP). While there are a number of interesting CERCLA issues in the case, the case is particularly noteworthy for its analysis of what might be required to qualify for the BFPP defense under the 2002 Brownfields Amendments.

Ashley II of Charleston, LLC (Ashley) was a sophisticated brownfields redevelopment company that had purchased the site shortly after passage of the 2002 Brownfields Amendments. Ashley intended to redevelop the site into a mixed-use project. It conducted a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (ESA) prior to purchasing the Holcombe and Fair Parties’ (27.62 acres) portion of the site in 2003. Ashley promptly contacted EPA to determine whether EPA needed any “specific cooperation, assistance, access or the undertaking of any reasonable steps” on the site. EPA sent Ashley an information request in 2004, to which Ashley promptly responded. Ashley collected over 450 soil samples to characterize and delineate known environmental conditions on the site. Ashley secured the site by providing access controls (fencing, gates and “no trespassing” signs) and periodic inspections. A contractor for EPA had conducted Phase I and Phase II Remedial Investigations between 1999 and 2001, and EPA had published an initial remediation plan in October of 2005. Ashley provided access to EPA in 2007 and submitted revised remediation plans in March and October of 2008.

Ashley conducted a Phase I Environmental ESA prior to purchasing the Allwaste (2.99 acres) portion of the site in 2008. This Phase I ESA identified the concrete pads and sumps on the site as “Recognized Environmental Conditions” and observed that there was evidence of staining and cracks, prior spillage, and elevated levels of contaminants in the soil and ground water. In total, Ashley spent approximately $195,000 assessing the environmental conditions on the site and estimated that cleanup would cost approximately $8-9 million.

In June of 2008, shortly after taking title, Ashley retained a consulting firm to demolish the remaining structures on the Allwaste parcel, but did not remove the underground structures, including cement pads, sumps, trenches and underground pipes. Runoff was able to collect in these structures and, according to the court, overflow with some degree of regularity. Ashley did not retain its own consultant to evaluate the sumps until September of 2009, and that consultant concluded that the sumps were not leaking. Ashley also did not assess the contents of a debris pile that it had been aware of since 2006, or remove this debris pile which contained hazardous substances, until 2008.

As part of its agreement to acquire the site, Ashley had also agreed to release and indemnify the prior owners, the Holcombe and Fair Parties, from all environmental claims, including response costs under the Environmental Laws.3 Upon learning that EPA was considering bringing cost reimbursement claims against the Holcombe and Fair Parties, Ashley contacted EPA, saying such an action would discourage Ashley’s future development activities.

In September 2005 Ashley had sued PCS Nitrogen, Inc.,4 a prior owner/operator of the site, seeking a declaratory judgment that PCS was liable for the expected remediation costs and for Ashley’s previously incurred costs. PCS, in turn, brought contribution claims against Ashley and several former owners and operators of the site,5 claiming that they were Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) and had liability for the environmental conditions on the site. Several of those parties filed counterclaims or cross-claims against the other parties. The court bifurcated the case into liability and allocation phases.

The court rejected PCS’s argument that the harm was divisible or that there was a reasonable basis for apportionment of those costs under the Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern6 decision. Instead, the court used equitable factors in the contribution action to allocate those costs among the parties. The court ultimately concluded that the following parties had liability for the listed percentages of the cleanup costs at the site:

Ross (fertilizer plant owner for 60 years, 1906-1966) 45%

PCS (conducted manufacturing operations for six years)7 30%

Holcombe and Fair Parties (former owners who engaged in earthmoving) 16%

RHCE (current tenant) 1%

Allwaste (former owner) 3%

Ashley8 (current owner) 5%

City of Charleston (former right-of-way holder) 0%

Key Holdings Relating to the BFPP Defense

The court analyzed in detail whether Ashley qualified as a BFPP under the 2002 Brownfields Amendments. It concluded that Ashley had satisfied five of the eight elements9 of the defense, but had failed to satisfy the remaining three. A number of the court’s conclusions are troubling for parties hoping to qualify for the BFPP defense in the future.

Whether All Disposals Occurred Before Taking Title. The District Court concluded that “disposals” were likely to have occurred after Ashley tore down the structures on the Allwaste parcel, leaving the sumps in place and allowing them to fill with rainwater. The court appeared to be particularly troubled by the fact that Ashley did not test under the concrete pads, sumps or trench to determine if the soil beneath these structures was contaminated. Ashley attempted to offer expert testimony that no disposals had occurred, but this testimony was stricken at trial. Accordingly, the court found that Ashley had not met its burden of proof10 that no disposals had occurred after it acquired the site. In other words, the new property owner must be prepared to prove a negative – that “no disposals” occurred.

It is particularly noteworthy that the court appeared to interpret “disposals” and “releases” differently. On a separate element of the defense – whether Ashley had provided all legally required notices – Ashley’s position was that no releases of hazardous substances had occurred that would have required notice to EPA or the state environmental agency. The court agreed that the record did not establish that any releases had occurred subsequent to Ashley’s acquisition of title. Accordingly, the court concluded that Ashley had satisfied its burden of proof on this element of the defense.

Whether the Purchaser Exercised Appropriate Care. Pointing to EPA’s Common Elements Guide11 and existing case law on “due care,” the court concluded that Ashley had not satisfied the “appropriate care” element of the BFPP defense. The court appeared to be particularly troubled by the fact that Ashley had not cleaned out and filled the sumps on the Allwaste parcel when it demolished the above-ground structures, but had instead left them exposed to the elements. Ashley’s decision to test, clean and fill the sumps in 2009 came too late, according to the court, to prevent possible releases. The court was also troubled by Ashley’s failure to prevent a debris pile from accumulating, to investigate the contents of that debris pile, or to remove the debris pile for over a year. The court considered these failures to be a lack of “appropriate care.” Ashley’s failure to maintain the crushed rock on the site, which was serving as a “cap” over much of the arsenic and lead contamination, was additional evidence of the lack of “appropriate care” in the court’s view.

Whether the Purchaser Was a Potentially Responsible Party or Affiliated With a Potentially Liable Party. In the aspect of the decision that is probably most troubling, the court concluded that Ashley had not met its burden of proof that it was not a PRP or affiliated with PRPs. First, apparently ignoring the language in section 9607(r) of the statute,12 it pointed to the fact that current owners and operators of a facility are liable for response costs, and that Ashley was the current owner of a majority of the site where hazardous materials were still leaching through the soils. Second, the court determined that Ashley’s efforts to dissuade EPA from recovering response costs from the Holcombe and Fair Parties, the prior owners whom Ashley had indemnified, revealed “just the sort of affiliation Congress intended to discourage.” Ashley II, slip op., at 103. This so-called affiliation precluded application of the BFPP defense.

What the Case May Mean for Future Brownfields Transactions

While Ashley II is binding case law only in the state of South Carolina, this decision is likely to have a significant chilling effect on future brownfields transactions throughout the country. If a sophisticated brownfields developer, which cooperated fully with the EPA and state environmental agency and which responsibly investigated the condition of the property, cannot qualify for the BFPP defense, then who can? Among other things, a number of determinations made by the court need to be clarified in future decisions, EPA guidance or congressional amendments to CERCLA if the BFPP defense is ever going to provide meaningful protection to brownfields redevelopers.

“Disposal.” The Ashley II court interpreted the phrase “disposal” to mean something more than “releases” or “threatened releases” that must be reported to regulatory officials.13 Pointing to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992), the court suggested that “disposal” does not have to include active involvement in dumping or placement of hazardous waste on a site, but could include spillage or leakage of the waste, or movement or dispersal of the waste. So, is passive migration of existing contamination through soil or groundwater enough to constitute “disposal”? If a broad interpretation of this phrase is upheld, in which the continued leakage or passive migration of contamination is sufficient to constitute “disposal,” then virtually no owner of a brownfields site will ever qualify for the BFPP defense. Surely, this cannot be what Congress intended when it enacted the BFPP defense.

Appropriate Care/Due Care. Despite finding earlier that no “releases” had occurred on the site after Ashley had acquired title, the court then determined that Ashley had not complied with the “appropriate care” elements of the defense. The “appropriate care” element of the defense is focused on stopping any continuing releases, preventing any threatened future releases, and preventing or limiting human, environmental or natural resource exposure to any previously released hazardous substance. In this regard, the court appears to have used the terms “disposals” and “releases” interchangeably. The court was influenced in part by the fact that Ashley’s consultant had identified the sumps and concrete pads as recognized environmental conditions (RECs). Is the REC designation (which simply means the presence or likely presence of hazardous substances or petroleum products under conditions that indicate an existing release, a past release, or a material threat of a release) now going to be enough to trigger heightened appropriate care requirements? What if the consultant had discussed these features but not designated them as a REC?

In light of the court’s broad interpretation of Ashley’s “appropriate care” obligation, it will behoove every brownfields redeveloper to examine its site carefully to determine whether there are any existing structures, waste piles or other areas of concern that may be contributing to continuing releases, threatened future releases, leakage or passive migration on the site and to address those threats promptly. While the site in question had been contaminated for more than 100 years, the court seemed particularly troubled by the fact that Ashley took a couple of years to sample, clean and fill underground sumps and to remove a debris waste pile, and that it failed to maintain the crushed rock as an adequate cover or cap on portions of the site.

The court also found that the former owners, the Holcombe and Fair Parties, had failed to exercise “due care” by waiting to put crushed stone on various parcels until those parcels had been leased, by failing to inform environmental authorities about the contamination and by failing to properly maintain certain stormwater detention ponds. Ashley II, slip op., at 88-89.

Affiliation Issue. Prospective purchasers will need to consider seriously whether they should release and indemnify a party who is clearly a PRP under CERCLA. It is not clear from the Ashley II decision whether every environmental indemnification might be considered to be proof of “affiliation” in future cases. Assuming that the mere existence of an environmental indemnity does not defeat the defense, the new owner should certainly refrain from taking any action with the regulators that might be construed as discouraging them from taking enforcement action against a PRP, even if that means that the new owner will be forced to honor an environmental indemnity that it has entered into in order to facilitate the sale.

Grading/Soil Movement. While not discussed in the sections of the opinion dealing with the BFPP defense, the court discusses elsewhere whether grading, excavating and proof rolling of contaminated soil could be sufficient to constitute “disposal,” thereby making the party engaging in those activities a PRP. The court concluded that it could. Ashley II, slip op., at 68-69. Most brownfields redevelopers will need to move potentially contaminated dirt around a site. If they do so responsibly, will this simple action be enough to void the BFPP defense? If so, virtually no one will ever qualify for the BFPP defense.

LURs/Institutional Controls. While the court concluded that Ashley had met its burden of proof on this element of the defense, it left open the question of what it means to be “in compliance with any land use restrictions” and to not impede “the effectiveness or integrity of any institutional controls.” Ashley’s environmental representative argued that there were no land use restrictions or unusual institutional controls in place on the site, and that it was in compliance with any controls that were being used. The court concluded that Ashley had met its burden of proof on this issue. This element of the defense could be more troublesome in future cases. For example, over the past couple of years, there has been a heated debate among the regulated community about the meaning of the term “land use restrictions,” and it seems reasonable to suggest that the court’s conclusion is consistent with the “narrow view” on this issue. In particular, the court did not consider the crushed stone, which constituted an engineering control on the site, to be a land use restriction.

Conclusion

Ashley II has now made it much more difficult to redevelop contaminated brownfields sites. It is clear that there are many potential pitfalls in trying to qualify for the defense, and that other PRPs and the court will probe every potential weakness in the defense. Congress, EPA and the courts should strongly consider what further guidance may be necessary to give the BFPP defense real teeth in order to satisfy its intended purpose. In the meantime, for anyone considering redevelopment of a seriously contaminated site, it would be prudent to obtain a “reasonable steps” letter from the EPA and to avoid incurring significant assessment and cleanup costs unless you are prepared to spend substantial sums litigating your entitlement to recoup those costs from the truly responsible parties.

United States District Court = Administrative Article I (legislative)
or
Article IV (territorial) court

District Court of the United States = Article III (judicial) court

"The alarm bells are going off all over the place," "We are in a crisis and treating it like a process where we can dither away forever." Alden Meyer, the Union of Concerned Scientists

The U.S. National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction (SDR) publication Grand Challenges for Disaster Reduction includes a set of Implementation Plans for various natural hazards, which provide further definitions and descriptions of these hazards. Research projects related to these hazards are among, but not limited to, those that would fit in the scope of Hazards SEES:

Visit JobCenter.USA.gov for information about professional certifications, registered apprenticeships, occupational licenses, and other opportunities that may help you get ahead.

In addition to education and training resources, you can use the job center to search for a job and learn about various career paths.

Ethics and Safety: How To Keep Your Program on the Right Side of the Fence (and the Law)

"code of silence" when an accident occurs, making it difficult to find out what really happened so that you can prevent a recurrence.

The Delaware Supreme Court recently held that a foreign business entity was subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of Delaware under a conspiracy theory. The foreign defendant allegedly conspired with other defendants to divest the plaintiff of his interest in a joint venture, which plan was accomplished, in part, by causing the dissolution of a Delaware limited liability company (LLC) co-founded by the plaintiff. The Delaware Supreme Court held that in order to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity under a civil conspiracy theory, facts must be alleged from which the court can infer that the foreign defendant knew or should have known that the conspiracy would have a Delaware nexus. The lower court found this requirement lacking, and held that the foreign defendant did not know about the Delaware connection until after the Delaware LLC had been dissolved. The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s analysis as to both the foreign defendant’s knowledge and the overall scope of the conspiracy, reasoning that even if there was no direct evidence that the foreign defendant knew about the dissolution before it occurred, the facts established that the defendant should have known it was dealing with a Delaware company. Further, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the conspiracy did not begin or end with the dissolution of the Delaware company and that the foreign defendant knew that its business partner had been a Delaware entity shortly after the dissolution, while the conspiracy was still ongoing. On these bases, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Matthew v. Flakt Woods Group SA, C.A. No. 5957-VCN (Del. Supr. Nov. 20, 2012).

California Court of Appeal applies three-year limitation under Delaware law to claim against dissolved Delaware corporation

In Greb v. Diamond Int’l Corp., 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 566 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Apr. 26, 2010), the California Court of Appeal for the First District affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a personal injury claim against a dissolved Delaware corporation, holding that the claim was filed more than three years after dissolution of the corporation in violation of Delaware General Corporation Law Section 278. In doing so, the Court made it clear that, for purposes of lawsuits filed in California against dissolved non-California corporations, the law of the state of incorporation controls whether claims are timely filed.

Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Greb had suffered injury from exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products. They filed a complaint in California state court against Diamond International Corporation on December 22, 2008. Diamond International, however, was dissolved on July 1, 2005. Section 278 of the Delaware General Corporation Law bars suits against dissolved Delaware corporations filed more than three years after the dissolution. To avoid this bar, plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to file a lawsuit in California under Section 2010 of the California Corporations Code section 2010, which permits lawsuits to be filed against a dissolved corporation irrespective of the date of dissolution.

The Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that Delaware law is applicable and controlling. The Court noted that Section 299(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict Laws states that whether a corporation continues its existence after it has been dissolved or suspended is decided by the state of incorporation. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1927), recognized this principle, stating that the existence of a corporation after dissolution “concerns the fundamental law of the corporation enacted by the State which brought the corporation into being.” Courts in other jurisdictions, including the federal courts in New York, have followed this by enforcing Delaware’s three-year bar on lawsuits filed against dissolved Delaware corporations.

The Court of Appeal also considered California authority. Although California courts have held generally that the law of the state of incorporation determines the consequence of corporate dissolution, the court in North American Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 902 (1986), held that Section 2010 of the California Corporations Code prevails over foreign corporation laws that limit survival periods of dissolved corporations. The Court in Greb, however, held that the ruling in North American Asbestos erroneously attempted to apply legislative intent where statutory authority clearly establishes that Section 2010 should not apply to foreign corporations. The Court also noted that the holding in North American failed to address Riley v. Fitzgerald, 178 Cal. App. 3d 871 (1986), which held to the contrary and was issued only two months earlier. Ultimately, the Court found North American to be unpersuasive.

The ruling in Greb reinforces the trend in California courts to apply the law of the state of incorporation to claims involving foreign corporations, a trend that adds to certainty for all parties embroiled in corporate litigation in California.


US ESA: Listed Threatened the Snake River spring/summer Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 57, Number 78, Pages 14653 - 14663, April 22, 1992
US ESA: Change in status from Threatened to Endangered the Sacramento River winter-run population, as published in Federal Register Volume 59, Number 2, Pages 440 - 450, January 04, 1994
US ESA: Petition to list as threatened or endangered the mid-Columbia River summer Evolutionarily Significant Unit not warranted according to 12-month petition finding, as published in Federal Register Volume 59, Number 184, Pages 48855 - 48860, September 23, 1994
US ESA: Proposal to list as endangered withdrawn the Snake River fall Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 63, Number 7, Pages 1807 - 1811, January 12, 1998
US ESA: Proposal to list as endangered withdrawn the Snake River spring/summer Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 63, Number 7, Pages 1807 - 1811, January 12, 1998
US ESA: Listed Endangered the Upper Columbia River spring-run Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 56, Pages 14308 - 14328, March 24, 1999
US ESA: Listed Threatened the Upper Willamette River Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 56, Pages 14308 - 14328, March 24, 1999
US ESA: Listed Threatened the Lower Columbia River Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 56, Pages 14308 - 14328, March 24, 1999
US ESA: Listed Threatened the Puget Sound Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 56, Pages 14308 - 14328, March 24, 1999
US ESA: Proposal to list as threatened withdrawn for the Southern Oregon and Northern California Coastal Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 179, Pages 50394 - 50415, September 16, 1999
US ESA: Proposal to list as threatened withdrawn for the California Central Valley fall-run Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 179, Pages 50394 - 50415, September 16, 1999
US ESA: Proposal to list as threatened withdrawn for the Snake River fall Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 179, Pages 50394 - 50415, September 16, 1999
US ESA: Listed Threatened the California Coastal Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 179, Pages 50394 - 50415, September 16, 1999
US ESA: Listed Threatened the Central Valley spring-run Evolutionarily Significant Unit, as published in Federal Register Volume 64, Number 179, Pages 50394 - 50415, September 16, 1999
US ESA: Petition to list as threatened or endangered the Upper Klamath and Trinity Rivers Evolutionarily Significant Unit not warranted according to 12-month petition finding, as published in Federal Register Volume 77, Number 63, Pages 19597 - 19605, April 02, 2012

Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Zion. (psalm 2)

Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Zion. (psalm 2)

3116(a) 40:258e-1 (less Feb. 26, 1931, ch. 307, Sec. last sentence). 6, as added Pub. L. 99-656,

When The Landfill Is Full…

FILED UNDER: Land, Garbage

The Biggest Fish Story Ever Told

Overlying Rights Performance based on what to do in a case of an EMERGENCY! Human rights report finds persistent persecution of the non-religious

40 USC Sec. 3115 01/03/2012

on behalf of the Government by a declaration of taking or otherwise. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 107-217, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1147

on behalf of the Government by a declaration of taking or otherwise. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 107-217, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1147

on behalf of the Government by a declaration of taking or otherwise. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 107-217, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1147on behalf of the Government by a declaration of taking or otherwise. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 107-217, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1147

on behalf of the Government by a declaration of taking or otherwise. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 107-217, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1147

What is the Implication of the Proposed Rulemaking on Small Entities?

What is a Small Business Advocacy Panel?

How Can I Get Involved?

$1.5 million at center of internal EPA battle over Superfund contractor’s alleged overbilling

Chinook Salmon - Protected

Protected Status

Quick Facts

About the Species

ESA Endangered

ESA Threatened

ESA Candidate

ESA Experimental Population

Scientific Classification

42 USC § 1986 - Action for neglect to prevent

How did we get here?

No good deed goes unpunished: the CERCLA BFPP defense in the wake of Ashley II

Stimulating Research Related to the Science of Broadening Participation

Stimulating Research Related to the Science of Broadening Participation

FEDERAL JURISDICTION (alternative site) JURISDICTION CASES: SUPREME COURT CIRCUIT COURT STATE

FEDERAL JURISDICTION (alternative site) JURISDICTION CASES: SUPREME COURT CIRCUIT COURT STATE

Tributary named in honor of the “offerings of Christ.”

Tributary named in honor of the “offerings of Christ.”

The only entry missing from Spanish army officer Jose Gabriel Maraga’s diary, which was kept from Sept. 25 through Oct. 23, 1808, was the entry for Oct. 8 – the day that he "discovered" the Sacramento River.

The only entry missing from Spanish army officer Jose Gabriel Maraga’s diary, which was kept from Sept. 25 through Oct. 23, 1808, was the entry for Oct. 8 – the day that he "discovered" the Sacramento River.

Title 5 U.S.C. §556(d) "When jurisdiction is challenged the burden of proof is on the government."

"No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction." "Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be ´assumed´, it must be proved to exist!" Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768

"The law requires PROOF OF JURISDICTION to appear on the Record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533

“[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”

How did we get here?

Clean Water: The Next Act - A Radio Special

Dec. 27, 2012 | EarthFix

Related Links:

Clean Water Act’s Anti-Pollution Goals Prove Elusive

July 18, 2012 | EarthFix/InvestigateWest

IMPAIRED WATERS

Cities And Towns Still Struggle To Control Sewage 40 Years After The Clean Water Act

Oct. 2, 2012 | EarthFix

Big city issues

Federal level realities

Polluting The Water With Toothpaste, Shampoo, And Drugs

Sept. 12, 2012 | OPB

How We Got Into Such A Mess With Stormwater

Oct. 17, 2012 | KCTS9

Clean Water Act’s Anti-Pollution Goals Prove Elusive

July 18, 2012 | EarthFix/InvestigateWest

IMPAIRED WATERS

LICENSES TO POLLUTE

Ecotrope

Clean Water Act Violators: 2009-2012

POLLUTERS ESCAPE SCRUTINY

EarthFix Poll: Does Clean Water Matter?

PERMIT VIOLATIONS

VIOLATIONS IGNORED

THE TOLERANT APPROACH

GOVERNMENT IS PART OF THE PROBLEM

ENDING POLLUTION BY PERMITTING IT

provided to clarify and improve the function

Judicial Conference of the United States to revisit the need

for a More Coherent Federal Judicial Data System

the chance to learn about biology through an observation-based approach.

Ensure Free Movement of People and Commerce.

Next-Generation National Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network (NG NNIN)

Program Solicitation NSF 13-521

IMPORTANT INFORMATION AND REVISION NOTES

SUMMARY OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

General Information

How Sites are Deleted from the NPL

Cleanup Process

on behalf of the Government by a declaration of taking or otherwise. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 107-217, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1147
on behalf of the Government by a declaration of taking or otherwise. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 107-217, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1147

FEDERAL JURISDICTION (alternative site)
JURISDICTION CASES:
SUPREME COURT
CIRCUIT COURT
STATE

FEDERAL JURISDICTION (alternative site)
JURISDICTION CASES:
SUPREME COURT
CIRCUIT COURT
STATE

Title 5 U.S.C. §556(d)
"When jurisdiction is challenged the burden of proof is on the government."

"No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction."
"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be ´assumed´, it must be proved to exist!"
Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768

Program Solicitation
NSF 13-521